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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year in the state of Washington thousands of real estate
transactions involving billions of dollars are consummated. Almost
without exception, these transactions involve an intermediary, namely
an escrow holder. Following a single set of written instructions as
agreed upon by the principals to the transaction-the client-deposi-
tors-the escrow holder, at different points in the transaction, takes
possession of the purchaser's earnest money deposit and the seller's
proceeds, and with them the opportunity to make beneficial use of
such funds.
Under the Supreme Court of Washington's Admission to Prac-
tice Rule 12, escrow holders certified as limited practice officers can
prepare certain routine legal documents incident to the closing of real
estate transactions.1 The quid pro quo for this privilege, however, is
that limited practice officers are subject to Admission to Practice Rule
12.1,2 a modified version of the Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts,
or IOLTA.3 Under the provisions of Admission to Practice Rule
12.1(c)(1), a limited practice officer:
who receives.., funds.., shall maintain a pooled interest-
bearing trust account for deposit of funds that are nominal in
amount or expected to be held for a short period of time. The
interest accruing on this account, not [sic] of reasonable check
and deposit processing charges.., shall be paid to the Legal
Foundation of Washington, as established by the Supreme
Court of Washington.'
Limited practice officers can no longer make beneficial use of a
client-depositor's funds by pooling them into a noninterest bearing
1. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE (APR) 12, Limited Practice Rule for Closing
Officers (West 2000). In addition, APR 12 specifies exactly what documents a limited practice
officer is permitted to prepare, including: promissory notes, guaranties, deeds of trust, reconvey-
ances, mortgages, satisfactions, security agreements, releases, Uniform Commercial Code docu-
ments, assignments, contracts, real estate excise tax affadavits, and bills of sale. WASH. APR
12(d).
2. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE 12.1, Preserving Identity of Funds and Prop-
erty in Transactions Closed by Limited Practice Officers (West 2000).
3. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 159 (1998) (explaining that
"[u]nder these programs, certain client funds held by an attorney in connection with his practice
of law are deposited in bank accounts. The interest income generated by the funds is paid to
foundations that finance legal services for low-income individuals.").
4. WASH. APR 12.1(c)(1) (West 2000).
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account to generate interest in the form of "earnings credits." Other-
wise, these credits would find their way to an escrow holder's sister
corporation, ostensibly as payment for bookkeeping services furnished
by the sister corporation on behalf of the escrow holder.
Like IOLTA rules elsewhere in the country,' Washington's
Admission to Practice Rule 12.1 (c)(1) has spawned its share of contro-
versy, including a suit brought by limited practice officers challenging
the rule's constitutionality.6 Although Legal Foundation of Washing-
ton was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment,7 a recent U.S
Supreme Court decision in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation8
effectively undercut the court's rationale in Legal Foundation of Wash-
ington, prompting an appeal by the plaintiffs.9
The Supreme Court's holding in Phillips suggests that the con-
stitutionality of Admission to Practice Rule 12.1 (c)(1) is ripe for reex-
amination. Upon such a reexamination, the broader issue would be
whether Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) operates as an uncon-
stitutional taking of property. Implicit within this question is the
narrower question of whose property interest is taken. A variation of
this question is what property interest, if any, does an escrow holder
have in the beneficial use of a client-depositor's funds.
As the recipient of funds generated by the operation of Admis-
sion to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1), the stakes for the Legal Foundation of
Washington are high: in 1998, nearly forty-three percent" of the
5. See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st
Cir. 1993) (holding that IOLTA rules are not a taking of plaintiffs property); Cone v. State Bar
of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that interest income on IOLTA accounts
was not within the legitimate expectations of the owner of the principal amount); Petition by
Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d 715 (Mass. 1985) (concluding that interest income on
nominal or short-term trust deposits is not property for constitutional purposes); In re Interest on
Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 648 S.W.2d 480 (Ark. 1983) (holding that participation in IOLTA
program must be conditional upon notice and approval from clients whose funds are so used); In
re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981) (holding that notification to clients
whose funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time is unnecessary).
6. Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., No. C97-0146C (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 30, 1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-35154 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1998) (holding that client-
depositors do not have a property interest in the proceeds from IOLTA accounts; lacking such a
property interest, APR 12 does not operate as an unconstitutional taking).
7. See id.
8. 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (holding that interest income generated by funds held in IOLTA
accounts is private property of owner of principal for purposes of Takings Clause).
9. Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington, No. C97-0146C
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-35154 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1998).
10. According to the Legal Foundation of Washington, approximately $3,041,000 of its
total 1998 revenues of nearly $6,998,000 were attributable to Limited Practice Officers. Approx-
imately $5,756,000 of the Foundation's total revenues were then awarded as grants, with nearly
$4,200,000 awarded to a single public interest law organization (e-mail from Jack Dragovich,
Fiscal Manager, Legal Foundation of Washington, to the author (Mar. 24, 1999) (on file with
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Foundation's revenue came from the application of the IOLTA rules
to limited practice officers.
This Comment arrives at the conclusion that Admission to Prac-
tice Rule 12.1 (c)(1) does indeed give rise to an unconstitutional taking.
Implicit within this conclusion is a determination (1) that earnings on
funds deposited in escrow, whether in the form of interest or earnings
credits, are property; (2) that Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1)
takes such property; and (3) that such taking warrants just compensa-
tion. Moreover, it is the client-depositor-not the limited practice
officer-who suffers the taking.
This determination comes on the heels of another equally impor-
tant conclusion: the standard disclosures used by the escrow industry
as the basis for making beneficial use of a client-depositor's funds fall
short of those required in a fiduciary relationship. As such, the very
provision that limited practice officers sought to restore by bringing
suit in Legal Foundation of Washington arguably constitutes a breach
of the escrow holder's fiduciary duty to the client-depositor.
Beginning with a definition of an escrow, Part II of this Com-
ment provides an overview of a transaction in escrow and an analysis
of the escrow holder's relationship with and duties to his client-
depositor. Part III discusses the statutory and regulatory constraints
imposed on escrow holders under Washington's Escrow Agent Regis-
tration Act. Part IV explores the evolution of the limited practice offi-
cer in Washington and the advent of Admission to Practice Rule 12.
Part V analyzes the takings implicated by Admission to Practice Rule
12. Finally, Part VI offers both a conclusion and suggested alterna-
tives to current practices.
II. COMMON LAW DUTIES OF AN ESCROW HOLDER
A. The Escrow Transaction
An analysis of the rights and responsibilities of escrow holders-
commonly referred to as escrow agents-begins with a definition of
escrow. Washington's Escrow Agent Registration Act offers a con-
venient starting point:
[A]ny transaction wherein any person or persons, for the pur-
pose of effecting and closing the sale, purchase, exchange, trans-
fer, encumbrance, or lease of real or personal property to another
person or persons, delivers any written instrument, money, evi-
author), and Legal Foundation of Washington, Statement of Activities for the Year Ended Decem.
ber 31, 1998, as published at <http://www.legalfoundation.org/fiscal.htm>).
[Vol. 23:735
Limited Practice Officers
dence of title to real or personal property, or other thing of value
to a third person to be held by such third person until the hap-
pening of a specified event or the performance of a prescribed
condition or conditions, when it is then to be delivered by such
third person, in compliance with instructions under which he is
to act, to a grantee, grantor, promisee, promisor, obligee, obli-
gor, lessee, lessor, bailee, bailor, or any agent or employee there-
of.11
Most transactions involving escrow holders entail an underlying
agreement between parties for the purchase and sale of real property.
In a typical transaction, a purchaser and seller designate in the pur-
chase and sale agreement an escrow holder to "close" the transaction.
The escrow transaction usually begins with the purchaser depositing
earnest money with the escrow holder. Shortly thereafter, both the
purchaser and seller sign a single contract with the escrow holder,
referred to as a "closing agreement and escrow instructions." These
escrow instructions govern the relationship amongst the escrow holder
and the purchaser and seller as client-depositors. 12
Often the escrow holder simply mails copies of the escrow
instructions to the client-depositors, including instructions to "sign
and return." Thus, not only do the client-depositors seldom negotiate
the terms of the agreement, but they often never even meet the escrow
holder until the time of closing. Given the stress, turmoil, and confu-
sion that surround many real property transactions, client-deposi-
tors-with perhaps the exception of seasoned professionals-likely
never read, let alone understand, the escrow instructions.
On a later designated date, referred to as "closing," the purchase
and sale agreement is consummated in accordance with the escrow
instructions. A closing entails two distinct transactions: (1) the
seller's transfer of marketable title to the purchaser, and (2) the pur-
chaser's delivery of sufficient funds to satisfy his obligations and close
the transaction.
Delivery of a deed by the seller to the purchaser via the escrow
holder as an intermediary accomplishes the requisite transfer of title.
Until the conditions specified in the escrow instructions are satisfied,
11. WASH. REV. CODE§ 18.44.010(3) (1998).
12. Typically, escrow instructions instruct the escrow holder to prepare the documents
necessary to close the transaction, order title insurance, prepare a settlement statement and pro-
rations of income and expenses, verify encumbrances, collect and disburse funds, and record
documents. The instructions also establish parameters for the close of the transaction and pay-
ment of a fee to the escrow holder, and specify certain tasks that are outside the scope of the
escrow holder's duties that must be performed by the purchaser and seller prior to closing.
Finally, the instructions give notice to the parties that the escrow holder is neither an advocate
nor a representative of either party.
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the seller's delivery of the deed is conditional. Once these conditions
are satisfied, the escrow holder records the deed before delivering it to
the purchaser. It is the delivery of the deed to the purchaser that con-
veys title.
Simultaneously, the purchaser and his lender deliver to the
escrow holder sufficient funds to close the transaction, with the escrow
holder typically depositing them into a trust account. These funds are
subsequently disbursed to the seller net of any closing costs-again
after all the conditions in the escrow instructions have been followed.
Once all the escrow conditions and instructions are satisfied and the
transaction is closed, the escrow terminates.
Absent instructions to the contrary, escrow holders not practic-
ing as limited practice officers must deposit a client-depositor's funds
into a noninterest bearing account. 3 In doing so, certain escrow hold-
ers engage in a complex transaction that allows them to indirectly
make beneficial use of a client-depositor's funds.
The transaction goes something like this: the officers of a cor-
poration acting as an escrow holder form a second, sister corporation
that performs the accounting and reconciliation services vis-a-vis a
client-depositor's funds as mandated under the Escrow-Trust
Account Procedures. 4 The sister corporation then enters into an
agreement with the depository bank holding the client-depositor's
funds to perform the accounting services for these funds. The escrow
holder then deposits the client-depositor's funds into a noninterest
bearing account with the same depository bank. Instead of paying the
escrow holder interest on the client-depositor's funds, the bank awards
the escrow holder something called earnings credits, which are calcu-
lated in the same manner as interest. Acting as nothing more than an
intermediary, the bank uses the escrow holder's earnings credits to
reimburse the sister corporation for the fee it charges the escrow
holder for the necessary accounting and reconciliation services. The
sister corporation-with the same corporate officers as the escrow
holder-in turn pays out its profits as dividends to its corporate offi-
cers."5 If earnings credits are equated to interest and the fees earned
by the sister corporation are imputed to the escrow holder, the regula-
13. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 208-680E-011(l) (1999).
14. Id. § 208-680E-011(7).
15. Such an arrangement was, in fact, suggested by a representative of the State of Wash-
ington's Department of Licensing as a way to avoid an undisclosed profit by an escrow holder.
Letter from Roland Runion, Chief Auditor, and Robert Mitchell, Assistant Executive Secretary,
State of Washington Department of Licensing to Mr. Hugh W. Hawkins, Jr., Revelle, Ries &
Hawkins, P.S. (November 1, 1988), as included in Addendum C to reply brief of appellants
Washington Legal Foundation, Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., No. C97-
0146C (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-35154 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1998).
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tion that mandates the use of the noninterest bearing account effec-
tively sanctions an escrow holder's nonconsensual beneficial use of his
client-depositor's funds, a clear breach of the escrow holder's fiduciary
duty.16
Limited practice officers, on the other hand, are subject to a dif-
ferent set of constraints under Admission to Practice Rule 12.1, and
are unable to make use of noninterest bearing accounts and the poten-
tially lucrative arrangement described supra. Rather than forego this
revenue stream, many limited practice officers have opted to turn in
their licenses as limited practice officers, while others have elected to
test the constitutionality of Admission to Practice Rule 12.1 by
bringing suit in Legal Foundation of Washington.
Just as escrow instructions can be a blur to client-depositors, the
characterization of the legal relationship between the escrow holder
and the client-depositors can appear amorphous and indeterminate.
The Florida Court of Appeals put it this way:
The law of escrow does not fall neatly within the established
rules of either contract, agency, or trust. The law of escrow is
complicated primarily by the fact that the escrow agent or
depositary provides a service to at least two parties with poten-
tial or actual adverse interests. The law has struggled to place a
reasonable and predictable duty upon the third party who elects
to perform this difficult task with its inherent potential for con-
flict.17
In what capacity does an escrow holder serve his principals, the
client-depositors? What are an escrow holder's duties to the client-
depositors? While there are no definitive answers, the following sec-
tion of this paper will help establish the contours of this relationship.
B. Escrow Holder as an Agent
A useful starting point for defining an escrow holder's relation-
ship to his principal is the concept of agency. An agency relationship
occurs when four elements are present: (1) A (as in agent) is a fiduci-
ary for P (as in principal, here, either the purchaser or seller); (2) A's
actions are subject to P's control; (3) P has manifested his consent to A
for A to act on P's behalf; and (4) A is subject to P's control, and A
16. Transaction extracted from agreements between SeaTac Systems Inc. and Columbia
State Bank, and SeaTac Escrow Inc. and Columbia State Bank, Washington Legal Found. v.
Legal Found. of Wash., No. C97-0146C (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 1998), Excerpts of Record 112-
119.
17. SMP, Ltd. v. Syprett, Meshad, et al., 584 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(citations omitted).
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has consented to this relationship.18 An escrow holder is not subject to
the direct control of either client-depositor, but instead must adhere to
the terms of the escrow instructions signed by the client-depositors.
Arguably, he does not meet the second condition of agency and would
not be considered an agent in the pure sense of the word. Rather, as
we will see in the next section, because the escrow holder is subject to
duties within the escrow instructions to which both client-depositors
are parties, he is arguably a dual agent owing duties to both principals.
C. Escrow Holder as a Trustee
An escrow holder's status as a dual agent is not entirely incon-
sistent with his also acting as a trustee on behalf of the client-deposi-
tor. His ability to serve in the latter capacity turns in part on the
definition of a trust. For this definition we turn to Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts § 2:
A trust ... is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property,
subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held
to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of
another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an
intention to create it.19
Comment h to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 sets forth
the elements of a trust:
[A] trust involves three elements, namely, (1) a trustee, who
holds the trust property and is subject to equitable duties to deal
with it for the benefit of another; (2) a beneficiary, to whom the
trustee owes equitable duties to deal with the trust property for
his benefit; (3) trust property, which is held by the trustee for
the beneficiary. 20
The escrow instructions and concomitant duties reflect the equi-
table duties required by the first element. The client-depositors, as
parties to the escrow instructions, stand as beneficiaries, establishing
the second element.
Satisfying the third element, that of trust property, or res, is a
slightly more complicated matter. In this setting it is important to
distinguish property from the actual subject matter of the trust. Prop-
erty denotes interests in things. 2' The things themselves, such as land
and money, constitute the subject matter of the trust. Interests in
18. JOSEPH L. FRASONA, AGENCY, 3 (1964).
19. Definition of Trusts, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
20. Id. at § 2 cmt. h.
21. Id. at § 2. cmt. c.
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property are either equitable or legal in nature. In escrow, the equita-
ble interests remain with the beneficiary, while the escrow holder
assumes certain legal interests, usually interests in money and certain
contractual rights. 22 The client-depositor's delivery of these property
interests to the escrow holder at the outset of the escrow nonetheless
establishes the requisite trust property, giving rise to the trust.
Comment d to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 32 offers
additional support for the premise that a trust is created in escrow
with the escrow holder as its trustee:
d. Deposits in Escrow. Where the owner of property delivers in
escrow the subject matter or an instrument of transfer, mani-
festing an intention that upon the happening of a certain event
the depositee should deliver the subject matter or the instrument
to a third person as trustee, and the owner does not reserve a
power of revocation, a trust is created at the time of the delivery in
escrow. Although the title to the property does not pass to the
trustee before the happening of the event, in the meantime he
holds in trust the rights created in him as a result of the deposit
in escrow. At the time of the delivery in escrow there is a pres-
ently created trust and not merely a trust to arise in the future,
although the trust property is at first the rights under the deposit
in escrow, and, later, on the happening of the condition, the
trust property is the property transferred.23
How, then, does one reconcile an escrow holder's status as a
trustee with the holder's simultaneous status as a dual agent, discussed
supra? The answer lies in the fluctuating role of the escrow holder vis-
a-vis the property interests deposited with him in escrow. Essentially,
this role is bifurcated depending on the stage-preclosing or postclos-
ing-of the transaction in escrow. Prior to closing ("the happening of
the condition"), the escrow holder acts as both trustee and dual agent.
As a dual agent, he is "subject to duties to perform for each party
which neither party alone can forbid."24 In this same preclosing stage,
the escrow holder essentially functions as an intermediary; the prop-
erty interests in his possession are "in statis ... available to neither the
grantor nor grantee, awaiting disposition by the agent in accordance
22. Because one can never have title to real property absent a deed to that effect (outside of
adverse possession), and the real property that is the subject matter of an escrow is typically
never deeded to the escrow holder, the escrow holder never has legal or equitable title to the sub-
ject matter real property. Consequently, here we concern ourselves solely with property in the
form of funds.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 32 cmt. d (emphasis added).
24. 30 C.J.S. Escrows § 8 (1955) (cited with approval in Radach v. Prior, 48 Wash. 2d 901,
906, 297 P.2d 605, 608 (1956)).
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with the terms of the agreement. However, once the escrow holder
fulfills these duties and the transaction closes, he is no longer a dual
agent but merely a trustee, holding property interests on behalf of his
client- depositors.
On at least one occasion, a Washington court acknowledged the
transformation of the relationship between the escrow holder and his
client-depositors, and thus the capacity in which he holds property,
upon the closing of a transaction. In Radach v. Prior, the Supreme
Court of Washington observed:
When the condition on which the instrument is to take effect is
performed, the nature of the dual agency changes and the depos-
itary becomes a mere agent or trustee for each party with respect
to the things in escrow to which each has thus become complete-
ly entitled, and his possession is equivalent to possession by
such party. 26
The Radach court acknowledges an escrow holder's status as
both a dual agent and a trustee. This approach suggests that the rela-
tionship between the escrow holder and the client-depositor at a given
point in the transaction matters less than the escrow holder's duties.
The next section of this Comment offers a rough sketch of these
duties.
D. Escrow Holder as a Fiduciary
While the exact nature of an escrow holder's relationship with
his client-depositors fluctuates, his duties do not. To the contrary, an
escrow holder's duty to his client-depositors is a distinct one. The
basis for this is the notion of a fiduciary, a rugged concept frequently
used to describe a series of legal relationships. A fiduciary is defined
as one "holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to
that of a trustee.., and having a duty to act primarily for another's
benefit in matters connected with such undertaking. '27 A fiduciary's
duty includes utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor.28
Washington courts, like others, recognize the unique relationship
between an escrow holder and his client-depositors. But, despite the
unique nature of this relationship, the Supreme Court of Washington
in National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors, Ltd., left no doubt
about the escrow holder's fiduciary duty to his client-depositors:
25. Commercial Street, Inc. v. Goldberg, 811 F. Supp. 900, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
26. Radach v. Prior, 48 Wash. 2d 901, 906, 297 P.2d 605, 608 (1956) (citing 30 C.J.S.
Escrows § 8 (1955)).
27. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 523.
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Whether he be designated escrow agent or escrow holder, or
both, makes little difference in law; the important thing is that as
an agent, holder or trustee for the parties, he occupies a fiduciary
relationship to all parties to the escrow... [he] owes a fiduciary
duty to his principals in the same way that all agents are held to
such standards.29
Thus, whether acting as an agent or a trustee, an escrow holder
owes a fiduciary duty to his client-depositors. A comparison of the
duty of loyalty owed by agents and trustees as fiduciaries as contained
in the Restatement (Second) reveals the versatility of the concept of
fiduciary duty. Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the duty
of loyalty owed by an agent to his principal includes a duty to account
for profits arising out of his employment.30 Under the Restatement
(Second) on Trusts, the duty of loyalty owed by a trustee to a bene-
factor includes "a duty not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary
and not to enter into competition with him without his consent, unless
authorized to do so by the terms of the trust or by a proper court."31
In either case, absent sufficient consent, a fiduciary is generally not at
liberty to profit at the expense of those to whom he owes a fiduciary
duty.
As a fiduciary, it follows that an escrow holder holds a client-
depositor's property-funds-in a capacity analogous to that of a
trustee. As such, the title to the funds, just like the corresponding
property interest, is bifurcated. Legal title to the property-one that
carries no beneficial interest-rests with the fiduciary, in this case the
escrow holder. Equitable title-and with it the beneficial interest in
the funds - remains with the client-depositor as beneficiary. Thus, in
his capacity as a fiduciary, an escrow holder has no property interest
per se in the beneficial use of funds deposited in escrow by a client-
depositor.
In addition to his fiduciary duty, an escrow holder must strictly
comply with the provisions of the escrow agreement,32 and is liable for
damages proximately resulting from his breach of these provisions, or
from exceeding the authority conferred on him by the instructions.33
29. National Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886, 910, 506 P.2d 20, 35
(1973) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON AGENCY § 388 (1958). "Unless otherwise agreed, an
agent who makes a profit in connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the
principal is under a duty to give such profit to the principal."
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. a (1959).
32. Styrk v. Cornerstone Inv., Inc., 61 Wash. App. 463, 472, 810 P.2d 1366, 1371 (1991).
33. Delson Lumber Co. v. Washington Escrow Co., 16 Wash. App. 546, 550, 558 P.2d
832,834 (1976).
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Certain client-depositors may opt to assign or bargain away their
beneficial interest to an escrow holder, perhaps in exchange for a
reduction in escrow fees. To what extent can a client-depositor make
such an assignment? Answering this question requires an examination
of the definition of beneficial interest:
Profit, benefit, or advantage resulting from a contract, or the
ownership of an estate as distinct from the legal ownership or
control... [I]n trust law, refers to interest of the beneficiary in
right to income or principle of trust funds, in contrast to trustee
who holds legal title.34
Yet another aspect of the definition of a fiduciary closes the loop:
A relation [in which] ... neither party may deal with the sub-
ject-matter of the trust in such a way as to benefit himself or
prejudice the other except in the exercise of the utmost good
faith and with thefull knowledge and consent of that other.35
These definitions suggest that a client-depositor may assign his
beneficial interest in funds placed in escrow provided he does so with
full knowledge and consent. The escrow holder, in his capacity as a
fiduciary, may in turn make good faith, beneficial use of the client-
depositor's funds to generate the earnings credits, more commonly
referred to as interest income discussed supra.
What exactly gives rise to "full knowledge and consent"? To
state it more precisely, what establishes the consent necessary for an
escrow holder in his capacity as a fiduciary to make beneficial use of a
client-depositor's funds? For the answer to this query we turn to the
next section of this Comment.
E. Basis for an Escrow Holder's Beneficial Use of a
Client-Depositor's Funds
The law's insistence on full knowledge and consent as the basis
for an escrow holder's beneficial use of his client-depositor's funds
reflects its long-standing presumption against transactions between a
trustee and his beneficiary.36 As such, courts regard with suspicion
direct dealings between a trustee and beneficiary.37 Such dealing can,
however, survive this scrutiny by a showing that the beneficiary
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 156 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
36. 1 J.W. PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 326 (7th ed.
1929).
37. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 941 (2d ed. 1995).
[Vol. 23:735
Limited Practice Officers
undertook it with full knowledge of the facts of the case and of his
legal rights."
Although little is written about the precise meaning of consent in
this context, one need not go far to find the meaning of consent for
breaches of trust in general. Consent is actually one of a trinity of
long-recognized exceptions to the liability of a trustee for breaches of
trust, the others being affirmation and release.39 For purposes of this
Comment, our concern is with consent, as it is the exception typically
used by escrow holders as the basis for beneficial use of a client-
depositor's funds. And although the consent exception generally con-
templates breaches of trust arising subsequent to the formation of the
trust, it appears sufficiently pliable to immunize dealings between a
client-depositor and escrow holder contemplated at the outset of an
escrow transaction.
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 216(1) sets forth the
parameters for employing consent in a trust setting: "[A] beneficiary
cannot hold the trustee liable for an act or omission of the trustee as a
breach of trust if the beneficiary prior to or at the time of the act or
omission consented to it." 40
But while the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 216 is long on
carving out the consent exception, it does not actually define "con-
sent." Although Washington courts have yet to address this issue, a
Colorado court provides a list of factors to consider in evaluating a
beneficiary's consent to deviations from the trust:
1) the beneficiary's education and business experience; 2) the
beneficiary's input in negotiating the terms of the allegedly
improper investment; 3) the clarity of the consent language; 4)
the amount of time the beneficiary had for deliberation before
signing the consent; 5) whether the beneficiary read the consent
and considered its terms before signing it; 6) whether the benefi-
ciary knew his or her rights under the trust and the relevant facts
when the consent was signed; 7) whether the beneficiary was
given an opportunity to consult with advisors or an attorney
before signing the consent; 8) whether the beneficiary's consent
was induced by improper conduct on the trustee's part. 41
The concept of consent within Restatement (Second) of Trusts §
216 is qualified, however, by a beneficiary's right to have knowledge
of material facts which the trustee knew or should have known. This
38. Id.
39. David B. Zoob, Exceptions to the Liability of Trustees, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 726 (1935).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216(1).
41. Beyer v. First National Bank of Colorado Springs, 843 P.2d 53, 59 (Colo. Ct. App.
1992) (citations omitted).
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right seems analogous to the "full knowledge" component of the full
knowledge and consent required before an escrow holder may make
beneficial use of a client-depositor's funds. What are material facts?
For that matter, what is full knowledge? While a trustee need not
advise a beneficiary of all the details of a transaction, the beneficiary
should be sufficiently informed of all facts which would aid him in
protecting his interest,42 such that the beneficiary understands the
character of the transaction 43 and is on equal footing with the trustee
as fiduciary." Going a step further, a beneficiary should also arguably
be informed of any dealings by the trustee as a fiduciary with himself
or his affiliates or subsidiaries.45
Thus, in the context of establishing the basis for an escrow
holder's beneficial use of a client-depositor's funds, full knowledge
and consent requires that the escrow holder inform the client-deposi-
tor of all facts which would aid the client in either protecting his inter-
est or understanding the transaction, such that the client-depositor
stands on equal footing with the escrow holder. This must be done in
a fashion that allows the client-depositor to have input as to the terms
of the consent, including sufficient time to deliberate them, and, if
necessary, seek independent counsel. Finally, the consent language
must be sufficiently clear, so that the client-depositor understands that
he is manifesting his consent.
As we will see in Part III of this Comment, the escrow industry's
language for a client-depositor's consent to an escrow holder's benefi-
cial use of his funds arguably falls well short of this standard.
III. THE REGULATION OF ESCROW HOLDERS UNDER
WASHINGTON'S ESCROW AGENT REGISTRATION ACT
In addition to the common law duties that escrow holders,
including those practicing as limited practice officers, owe client-
depositors as both agents and trustees, holders also owe duties under
the Washington Escrow Agent Registration Act 46 and related provi-
sions of the Washington Administrative Code. Enacted in 1965 to
protect the public47 and the clients of the escrow agents and officers, 41
42. Esmieu et al. v. Schrag et al., 88 Wash. 2d 490, 498, 563 P.2d 203, 207 (1977).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 cmt. k.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 cmt. a.
45. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.090 (1998) (prohibiting certain transactions by a fidu-
ciary with an affiliate or subsidiary company, except when expressly provided for in the trust).
46. WASH. REV. CODE§ 18.44 (1998).
47. See Estate of K.O. Jordan v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 120 Wash. 2d 490,
497, 844 P.2d 403, 408 (1993).
48. Id. at 498, 844 P.2d at 409.
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the Act regulates the activities of most escrow holders conducting
business in the state of Washington. The Act is administered by the
Department of Financial Institutions.49
The Act distinguishes between escrow agents and escrow offi-
cers: an escrow agent encompasses any sole proprietorship, firm, asso-
ciation, partnership, or corporation engaged in the business of
performing the duties of an escrow, 0 whereas an escrow officer is any
natural person handling escrow transactions on behalf of an escrow
agent.5' While an escrow agent must be registered, 2 an escrow officer
must be licensed.5 3
With limited exceptions, all escrow agents must possess a valid
certificate of registration as 'issued by the Director of Financial Insti-
tutions.5 4 An application for registration as an escrow agent is filed
with the Director, and it must include the applicant's business form
and place of organization, credit history, proof of "honesty, veracity,
and good reputation," disclosure of certain criminal convictions and
civil judgments, and designated supervising escrow officer.55 At the
time of filing, the applicant must furnish proof of a fidelity bond and
an errors and omissions policy providing coverage of $200,00056 and
$50,000, s7 respectively as evidence of financial responsibility. The
Act also requires escrow agents to keep adequate records, and to keep
all funds held by the agent pending closing of the transaction in a
separate escrow fund account, segregated from the agent's own
funds.59 While nothing in the Act prevents an escrow holder from
pooling the funds of client-depositors, he must maintain a separate
ledger sheet for each escrow transaction.60 Proof of registration as an
49. Id. § 18.44.010(2) (1998).
50. Id. § 18.44.010(U)(7).
51. Id. § 18.44.010(7).
52. Id. § 18.44.020 (1977).
53. Id. § 18.44.290 (1995).
54. Id. § 18.44.020.
55. Id. § 18.44.040 (1977).
56. Id. § 18.44.050(1) (1979).
57. Id. § 18.44.050(2).
58. Arguably, the required coverage under both the fidelity bond and errors and omissions
policy is woefully inadequate given the cost of residential real property-the sale of which is the
most common transaction handled by escrow holders. As of January 1999, the median price of a
single family residence offered for sale in King County, the most populous county in the State of
Washington, was $279,000. Thus, damages arising from an escrow holder's misappropriation of
funds for a single transaction could conceivably exceed the combined limits of coverage under
the fidelity bond and errors and omissions policy. Steven Wayne, Editorial, Easing the Urban
Housing Crunch, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999.
59. WASH. REV. CODE§ 18.44.070 (1968).
60. WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 208-680E-011(7) (1999).
20001
Seattle University Law Review
escrow agent is required in order to bring an action in a Washington
court to collect an escrow fee.6
Every escrow agent engaged in escrow transactions must be
supervised by a licensed escrow officer.62 Licensure requirements for
an escrow officer include passing the escrow officer examination-
which tests language, arithmetic, principles and forms of real estate
conveyancing, obligations between principals and agents, and real
property encumbrances-and submitting an application, including
proof of honesty, truthfulness, and good reputation.63
Enforcement of the Act is the responsibility of the attorney gen-
eral and prosecuting attorneys,64 either of whom may seek a restraining
order or injunction to enjoin any person conducting business as an
escrow agent without the necessary certificate of registration, or any
certificated escrow agent from conducting business in an inappropriate
manner or in violation of the Act.6S
The Director of Financial Institutions has the overall responsi-
bility of issuing and enforcing rules and regulations pertaining to the
registration of escrow agents and licensing of escrow officers. He may
order the denial, suspension, or revocation of a certificate of registra-
tion or license of any escrow agent or escrow officer if he finds that the
applicant or agent/officer was found guilty of any one of a series of
acts or omissions, including the conversion of funds ".. . delivered to
him in trust or on condition,, 66 or "[a]ccepting, taking, or charging
any undisclosed commission, rebate or direct profit on expenditures
made for the principal."67
The Director also has broad investigatory powers: subject to the
Washington Administrative Procedures Act,6' he may conduct inves-
tigations69 of reported violations of the Act, and may subpoena wit-
nesses, take evidence, and require the production of any relevant
matter.7" Upon a written finding of fact that the Act has been or is
about to be violated, the Director may issue a cease and desist order.
In addition to being subject to the Act, these same escrow hold-
ers are also subject to certain rules and regulations promulgated in the
61. WASH. REV. CODE§ 18.44.180 (1998).
62. Id. § 18.44.200.
63. Id. § 18.44.290.
64. Id. § 18.44.150.
65. Id. § 18.44.160.
66. Id. § 18.44.260(5).
67. Id. § 18.44.260(8)
68. Id. § 18.44.270.
69. Id. § 18.44.260.
70. Id. § 18.44.280.
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Washington Administrative Code. 1  Chapter 208-680E, Escrow-
Trust Account Procedures, is particularly relevant, as it governs the
administration of funds held by escrow holders. As a general proposi-
tion, the regulations require escrow holders, other than limited prac-
tice officers, to deposit funds received from any client-depositor into a
noninterest bearing demand trust account in a recognized Washington
state depository.72
A notable exception to this requirement is a provision whereby
escrow holders other than limited practice officers may place funds in
an interest-bearing account "if directed by written agreement signed
by the principals to the transaction and specifying the manner of dis-
tribution of accumulated interest to the parties to the transaction."73
To what extent does compliance with these provisions of the
Washington Administrative Code comport with an escrow holder's
common law duties to act as a fiduciary and to follow instructions? If
an escrow holder places the funds in an interest-bearing account as
prescribed by § 208-680E-011(1)(a), then as long as he distributes the
interest in compliance with the client-depositors' written instructions,
he will fulfill his fiduciary duty to refrain from profiting from the use
of the client-depositors' property absent their consent, as well as his
duty under Styrk to strictly comply with the escrow instructions.
The regulations also permit an escrow holder not practicing as a
limited practice officer to make limited beneficial use of a client-
depositors' funds. As allowed under § 208-680E-011(1), these escrow
holders may deposit a client-depositor's funds into a noninterest bear-
ing demand deposit account to generate earnings credits for the benefit
of the escrow holder.
The regulation does not specifically require the escrow holder to
obtain the client-depositor's full knowledge and consent before mak-
ing beneficial use of his funds. Arguably, an escrow holder can make
limited beneficial use of a client-depositor's funds in compliance with
§ 208-680E-011(1) yet fail to met his fiduciary duty to obtain the
client-depositor's full knowledge and consent.
Perhaps even more troubling is the manner in which an escrow
holder typically obtains such consent. In those transactions where an
escrow holder intends to use the client-depositor's funds to generate
71. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 208-680 A-F (1999). Under these rules and regulations, in
order to be licensed as an escrow holder, an applicant must take an examination, submit to a
credit and character check, and pay certain fees. Once licensed, an escrow holder must maintain
accurate records, act expeditiously, disburse funds in a timely fashion, comply with a series of
trust account procedures, and maintain a fidelity bond and errors and omissions policy.
72. Id. § 208-680E-011(1).
73. Id. §§ 208-680E-011(1)(a)-(b).
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earnings credits, the escrow holder will generally include within the
escrow instructions a generic disclosure to the following effect:
All money received by ESCROW AGENT in this escrow is to
be deposited in escrow bank accounts controlled by ESCROW
AGENT pending closing. ESCROW AGENT receives bank-
ing benefits from non-interest bearing trust account deposits.
These benefits may be in the form of but not limited to miscel-
laneous banking, accounting and computer support services. If
an interest bearing account is to be established, ESCROW
AGENT must be so advised in writing, prior to the deposit of
funds, and furnished with a Federal Tax Identification Num-
ber. 74
The issue here is whether such a disclosure is sufficient to give
rise to the "full knowledge and consent" necessary for an escrow
holder in his capacity as a fiduciary to make beneficial use of a client-
depositor's funds.
A 1978 decision by the Supreme Court of Oregon suggests that it
is. In Derenco v. Benj. Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Association,7"
borrowers brought suit against a savings and loan association to obtain
an accounting of profits on funds in reserve accounts established to
pay taxes and insurance premiums on mortgaged residences. The
court concluded that a provision in a conventional mortgage that the
funds in the reserve account would be noninterest bearing was the
equivalent of an agreement that the reserves would not be the source
of any income to the borrower.76 Included within the court's rationale
was the notion that not only was the issue not raised by the borrowers,
who agreed that they would not receive any income from the use of the
funds, but that the issue was specifically raised by the lender.77
Following Derenco's reasoning, disclosure within an escrow
agreement to the effect that the funds will be placed in a noninterest
bearing account, let alone that they will be used by the escrow holder
to earn banking privileges, is sufficient to establish the consent neces-
sary for the escrow holder to make limited, beneficial use of the funds
from the standpoint of one court.
But an important factual distinction in Derenco indicates that the
court stopped short of endorsing it as the standard for full knowledge
and consent. Derenco involved an arms length transaction between a
74. Standard Closing Escrow Instructions, as furnished by Pacific Northwest Title Com-
pany of Washington, Inc., 1997 (on file with author).
75. 577 P.2d 477 (Or. 1978).
76. Id. at 493.
77. See id.
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bank as creditor and its customer, the mortgagor, as debtor. As such,
the bank had no duty to act in the best interest of the customer.
Compare this relationship with the fiduciary relationship between an
escrow holder and a client-depositor, a relationship characterized by
trust, confidence, candor, and not a whiff of hard bargaining. This
distinction leads to the conclusion that Derenco-style disclosures are
inadequate for the fiduciary relationship between an escrow holder
and his client-depositor.
We must instead compare the escrow industry's generic disclo-
sure to that required for full knowledge and consent as set forth in Part
II. As the reader may recall, this standard requires the escrow holder
to use clear language to inform the client-depositor of all facts which
would aid him in either protecting his interest or understanding the
transaction, while allowing the client-depositor sufficient time to
deliberate the terms of the consent, in order that the client-depositor
be on equal footing with the escrow holder.78
The generic disclosure does mention the fact that the deposits
will be noninterest bearing. But in a style reminiscent of a negative
pregnant,79 the disclosure fails to mention that the deposits are nonin-
terest bearing to the client-depositor. Nor does it mention that the
deposits generate earnings credits, calculated in a fashion similar to
that of interest, for the escrow holder. The disclosure also makes no
mention of the intermediary role played by the escrow holder's sister
corporation as the provider of accounting and reconciliation services,
for which it receives a fee. Finally, the disclosure makes no mention of
the fact that the client-depositor is indeed consenting to a transaction
that would otherwise give rise to a breach of trust. Given these omis-
sions, the client-depositor is unaware of the nature of the transaction
such that he is not on equal footing with the escrow holder. As such,
this disclosure falls short of that necessary to establish full knowledge
and consent.
What emerges from the overlay of the statutory and regulatory
scheme of the Escrow Agent Registration Act on the escrow holder's
common law duties is that an escrow holder has no per se property
interest in the beneficial use of a client-depositors' funds; such prop-
erty interests are retained by the client-depositor. What property
interest the escrow holder does have-namely, to make beneficial use
of a client-depositor's funds deposited into a noninterest bearing
78. See supra Part II.
79. Often introduced in the first year of law school, this term is defined as "a denial imply-
ing its affirmative opposite by seeming to deny only a qualification of the allegation itself...
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
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account-requires, at least under the common law, full knowledge and
consent on the part of the client-depositor. Without it, an escrow
holder who makes beneficial use of a client-depositor's funds under
the complex arrangement permitted under § 208-680E-011(1) has
arguably breached both his common-law fiduciary duty to his client-
depositor and a statutory duty to refrain from "[a]ccepting, taking, or
charging any undisclosed commission, rebate, or direct profit on
expenditures made for the principal."8
The administration of funds held in escrow by limited practice
officers, however, is subject to an entirely different provision of the
Washington Administrative Code, namely § 208-680E- 011 (1)(c). 81
This provision in turn subjects limited practice officers to Admission
to Practice Rule 12.1,82 a modified version of the Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts (IOLTA). Beginning with the history of the devel-
opment of the limited practice officer, the next section of this Com-
ment discusses the impact of these regulations on the administration
of funds held by limited practice officers.
IV. LIMITED PRACTICE OFFICERS AND ADMISSION
TO PRACTICE RULE 12
The application of IOLTA rules to escrow accounts adminis-
tered by limited practice officers is actually the culmination of a series
of judicial, statutory, and regulatory developments that flow from the
premise that only those admitted to the state bar may practice law."
In Washington State Bar Association v. Great Western Union Federal
Savings and Loan Association, the court held that a lender's selection
and preparation of deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, and promissory
notes constituted the unauthorized practice of law.84 In response to
Great Western and in order to provide for a more economical alterna-
tive for the preparation of routine legal documents required in real
estate transactions, 85 in 1979 the Washington legislature enacted sec-
tion 19.62 of the Revised Code of Washington. 6 This statute author-
ized banks, escrow holders, title insurance companies and others
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.44.260(8) (1998).
81. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 208-680E-011(1)(c) (1999).
82. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE 12.1 - Preserving Identity of Funds and
Property in Transactions Closed by Limited Practice Officers (West 2000).
83. WASH. REV. CODE§ 2.48.170 (1998).
84. See Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great Western Union Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 91
Wash. 2d 48, 586 P.2d 870 (1978).
85. Jayanne A. Hino, Unauthorized Practice of Law--Limited Practice of Law for Real
Estate Closing Officers, 57 WASH. L. REV. 781, 787 (1981).
86. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.62.010-900, repealed by 1992 Washington Laws, chapter 91,
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typically engaged in the closing of real estate transactions to select and
prepare a series of legal documents commonly associated with real
estate closings.
In 1981 the tide turned against escrow holders and other author-
ized laypersons engaged in the preparation of these routine legal docu-
ments when the constitutionality of section 19.62 of the Revised Code
of Washington was challenged in Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl
v. Kassler Escrow, Inc.87 In Bennion, a law firm attempted to enjoin an
escrow holder from preparing legal documents pursuant to the closing
of a real estate transaction. In deciding Bennion shortly after the
passage of section 19.62 the court held that the legislature's enactment
of section 19.62 constituted an encroachment on the judiciary's exclu-
sive right to regulate the practice of law, and declared the statute
unconstitutional.88
To mitigate the demise of section 19.62, in 1981 the Washington
State Bar Association recommended and the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington adopted Admission to Practice Rule 12, Limited Practice Rule
for Closing Officers.89 Admission to Practice Rule 12 "authorize[s]
certain lay persons to select, prepare and complete legal documents
incident to the closing of real estate ... transactions .. ."90
The IOLTA provisions governing a limited practice officer's
administration of funds are relatively straightforward. All funds
received by limited practice officers "shall be deposited into one or
more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts... ."91 Funds "nom-
inal in amount or expected to be held for a short period of time...
must be deposited into a pooled interest-bearing checking account,"
with the interest-net of reasonable bank charges-paid to the Legal
Foundation of Washington.92 Otherwise, the funds must be deposited
in a separate interest-bearing trust account, with the interest distri-
buted to the parties to the transaction as provided for in the agree-
ment.93
Regrettably, Admission to Practice Rule 12(c) does not set forth
a definition of either "nominal" or "short period of time." Instead, the
limited practice officer must determine the type of account into which
87. 96 Wash. 2d 443, 635 P.2d 730 (1981).
88. Id. at 453 35 P.2d at 736.
89. William H. Reetz, Gretchen L. Valentine, Duties and Responsibilities of the Escrow
Agent, 3 WASHINGTON REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK, Sec. 3.1 at 3-1, Sec. 3.4(2) at 3-30
(Edward W. Kuhrau et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997).
90. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE (APR) 12(a)-Limited Practice Rule for
Closing Officers (West 2000).
91. WASH. APR 12.1(b).
92. WASH. APR 12.1(c)(1).
93. WASH. APR 12.1(c)(2).
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the funds should be deposited. In making this determination, the
limited practice officer "shall consider only whether the funds to be
invested could be utilized to provide a positive net return to the cli-
ent ....
How does this regulation comport with the provisions governing
administration of funds by escrow holders not practicing as limited
practice officers? Under Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1), a cli-
ent-depositor cannot contract to allow the limited practice officer to
deposit the client-depositor's funds into a noninterest bearing account
to generate earning credits which make their way back to the officers
of the corporate escrow holder via a sister corporation, ostensibly in
exchange for lower escrow fees for the client-depositor. To this
extent, the client-depositor cannot bargain away an element of his
beneficial interest. Additionally, in those situations where the funds
are either nominal in amount or will be held for only a short period of
time, a client-depositor is prohibited from earning interest on the
funds. Instead, to the extent the funds can be used to generate a
beneficial interest, the Supreme Court of Washington requires that the
interest be paid to the Legal Foundation of Washington.
To what extent does either of these provisions rise to the level of
an unconstitutional taking of property? Although the United States
District Court in Legal Foundation of Washington concluded that these
same provisions were not unconstitutional, as discussed in the next
section of this paper, the subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Phillips suggests a different conclusion.
V. A "TAKINGS" ANALYSIS OF ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE 12
Before proceeding to the takings analysis, a more precise state-
ment of the issue is in order: Whether the requirement under Admis-
sion to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) that a client-depositor's funds that are
either nominal in amount or will be held for only a short period of
time be deposited into interest-bearing accounts, with the interest dis-
tributed to the Washington Legal Foundation, operates as an uncon-
stitutional taking of the client-depositor's beneficial interest, including
94. WASH. APR 12.1(c)(3). As real estate transactions typically involve substantial sums
of money, seemingly the application of APR 12(c)(3) would always lead to the conclusion that
funds held by a limited practice officer can yield a net positive return. Even an earnest money
deposit of 5% of the purchase price is hardly nominal. Given the thirty to ninety days that it
takes to typically close even the simplest real estate transaction, it is hard to imagine circum-
stances in which earnest money deposited with a limited practice officer could not earn a net
positive return. The same is true for the balance of the purchase price. While the limited prac-
tice officer might hold these funds for only a brief period of time, a few hours or perhaps over-
night, the magnitude of the sum, often hundreds of thousands of dollars, is seemingly sufficient
to earn a net positive return for the client depositor.
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his right to assign his beneficial interest to a limited practice officer,
who uses such beneficial interest to generate earnings credits.
A very similar issue was litigated in Legal Foundation of Wash-
ington.9 In Legal Foundation of Washington, the court held that first,
an escrow client-depositor had no property interest in the IOLTA
program interest,96 and that second, limited practice officers had no
ownership interest in the earnings credits created by the escrow client-
depositors' funds.97 In reaching its first holding, the court relied on an
Eleventh Circuit decision in Cone v. State Bar of Florida" while reject-
ing a Fifth Circuit decision to the contrary in Washington Legal Foun-
dation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation.9
However, in its recent five-to-four decision in Phillips affirming
Texas Equal Access, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
Eleventh Circuit's conclusion in Cone, instead holding that interest
income in IOLTA accounts is the "private property of the owner of
the principal.""1 ' As such, the Supreme Court effectively undercut the
District Court's first holding in Legal Foundation of Washington. Fur-
thermore, the District Court's second holding is suspect in that it fails
to take into account the ability of a principal to assign elements of his
beneficial interest. As such, the District Court's conclusions in Legal
Foundation of Washington as to the takings claims raised by the
IOLTA provisions of Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) are ripe
for reexamination.
A second look at the takings claims under Admission to Practice
Rule 12.1(c)(1) begins with the source of law. Under the federal con-
stitution, the takings clause in the Fifth Amendment provides that
"[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."' 0 ' The Fifth Amendment was made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in
1897.12 The basic purpose of the Takings Clause is to "bar Govern-
95. Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington, No. C97-0146C
(W.D. Wash. January 30, 1998) appeal docketed, No. 98-35154 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1998).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that client-depositors do not have a property
interest in the IOLTA interest).
99. 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the premise that clients do not have a valid prop-
erty interest in the interest proceeds earned in funds in IOLTA account), affd sub nom., Phillips
v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
100. Phillipsv. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'1
3
A takings claim entails three distinct questions; namely, "whe-
ther the interest asserted by the plaintiff is property, whether the
government has taken that property, and whether the plaintiff has
been denied just compensation for the taking."' 04
A. Client-Depositor's Beneficial Interest as Property
In addressing the first element of a takings claim, the broader
issue of an unconstitutional taking under Admission to Practice Rule
12.1(c)(1) can be stated more narrowly: Does a client-depositor's
beneficial interest in funds nominal in amount or expected to be held
for a short period of time-including the right to assign such interest
to a limited practice officer for purposes of generating earnings cred-
its--constitute property for purposes of a taking under the Fifth
Amendment?
In Phillips, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to have squarely
answered this question in the affirmative, holding that "interest
income generated by funds in IOLTA accounts is the 'private prop-
erty' of the owner of the principal."'0 5 Phillips is somewhat distin-
guishable from the Legal Foundation of Washington in that it was
brought on behalf of the client-depositor of a Texas lawyer rather than
a Washington limited practice officer. However, the distinction
makes little difference, because the IOLTA rules litigated in Phillips
use language that is strikingly similar to that litigated in Legal Foun-
dation of Washington and embodied in Admission to Practice Rule
12.1(c)(1)."6
In reaching its decision, the Phillips court first looked at Texas
law to determine the ownership of the underlying principal. In doing
so it determined that under the Texas IOLTA rules, the principal
belonged to the client.0 7 Applying the general rule that the ownership
103. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
104. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 197.
106. Washington's Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) encompasses only those "funds
that are nominal in amount or expected to be held for a short period of time." See WASH. APR
12.1(c)(1) (West 2000). Compare this to the similar scope of the Texas IOLTA program, which
includes "client funds that are 'nominal in amount' or 'reasonably expected to be held for a short
period of time'." Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F.
Supp. 1, 4 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), affd sub nor. Phillips v.
Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (quoting Rule 6 of [Texas] State Bar Rules Gov-
erning Operation of Equal Access to Justice Program).
107. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164.
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of "interest follows principal,"' 8 the court ruled in favor of the
respondent, the Washington Legal Foundation, and concluded that
the interest earned on a client's funds in an IOLTA account belongs
to the client.
The majority in Phillips rejected the petitioner's argument that a
client's funds, absent the pooling of funds available through an
IOLTA account, "cannot reasonably be expected to generate interest
income on their own."'0 9  The majority went even further and
acknowledged its "recognition that property is more than economic
value,".and that it consists of "the group of rights which the so-
called owner exercises in his dominion of the physical thing [such] as
the right to possess, use, and dispose of it.'
While the majority opinion in Phillips offers a simple, clear, and,
in the case of this paper, useful rule, it is not without its detractors. In
his dissent, Justice Souter chastised the majority for "addressing only
the issue of the property interest" and "leaving the questions of taking
and compensation for a later day.""' In a separate dissent, Justice
Breyer pointed out that the principal in the case of IOLTA accounts"otherwise is barren,""' 3 and that the "value of what is taken is
bounded by that which is 'lost' not that which the taker gained.""' 4
Following the rule of Phillips, to the extent a client-depositor's
funds are used to earn interest, such interest is clearly the property of
the client-depositor. This result is consistent with both the definition
of beneficial interest as retained by the client-depositor, including the"right to income or principle of trust funds,"' 5 and the duties imposed
upon a limited practice officer in his capacity as a fiduciary." 6
Furthermore, although the Phillips court did not directly address
the issue, its broad definition of property-"the group of rights which
the so-called owner exercises in his dominion of the physical thing as
the right to possess, use, and dispose of it"" 7-- would seemingly
encompass a client-depositor's assignment of his beneficial interest to
108. Id. at 167.
109. Id.
110. Loretto v. Telepromter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982) (quoted in
Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998)).
111. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (quoted in Phillips
v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998)).
112. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 173 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) (quoted in Phil-
lips, 524 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
115. See discussion supra Part l.D.
116. See discussion supra Part I.D.
117. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170 (quoting United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 378
(1945)).
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a limited practice officer to earn banking privileges. Ironically, such
an assertion is not inconsistent with Justice Breyer's dissent, in which
he points out that the "value of what is taken is bounded by that
which is 'lost' not that which the taker gained." '118 What is lost in this
case is the client-depositor's ability to assign his beneficial interest to a
limited practice officer who in turn may convert it into earnings cred-
its. Although the government does not directly take these earnings
credits from either the limited practice officer or the client-depositor,
the ability of either to realize this form of property is essentially lost.
Thus, both the majority and Justice Breyer's dissent seem to suggest
that the beneficial interest assigned by the client-depositors to limited
practice officers for purposes of generating earnings credits is indeed a
form of property.
Assume for a moment that the petitioner's argument in Phillips
that the client-depositor's funds held in an IOLTA account "cannot
reasonably be expected to generate interest income on their own" were
upheld, and the interest earned thereon was not property for purposes
of a taking. Is it still valid to conclude that a client-depositor's
assignment of his "barren" beneficial interest in such funds to a lim-
ited practice officer is a form of property? Arguably it is, and with
help from the logic implicit in the petitioner's argument. The premise
of the petitioner's argument is that without the intervention of a third
party, in this case the government in its requirement for a pooling of
funds, the client-depositors' funds are incapable of generating a
return. As such, the party that makes possible the pooling and the
attendant return should be able to direct the use of the return. Under
the rationale of Phillips, such a party would be the government by
virtue of its IOLTA regulations.
But the government is not alone in its ability to generate returns
from pooled funds, funds that on their own would not generate a
return. Escrow holders not licensed as limited practice officers do the
same thing by pooling client-depositor funds in noninterest bearing
accounts, which in turn generate earnings credits. Instead of distrib-
uting the return to a third party having nothing at stake in the under-
lying transaction, the escrow holders retain the earnings credits and
arguably can offer their client-depositors lower escrow fees, resulting
in increased economic efficiency.
In light of the holding in Phillips that interest income generated
by funds in IOLTA accounts is the "private property" of the owner of
the principal, it follows that a client-depositor's beneficial interest in
118. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Boston Chamber of Com-
merce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
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funds nominal in amount or expected to be held for a short period of
time, including the right to assign such interest to a limited practice
officer for purposes of generating earnings credits, constitutes property
for purposes of a taking under the Fifth Amendment. In light of this
holding, the holdings of the district court in Legal Foundation of
Washington are in need of reexamination.
B. Operation of Admission to Practice Rule 12 as a Taking of Client-
Depositor's Beneficial Interest
The second element of a takings claim requires a showing that
the government has taken the property of a private party. Regulatory
takings-those short of physical ouster or direct appropriation-were
first addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1922 in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon."9 In Mahon, Justice Holmes laid down the gen-
eral rule that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking., 121
Generally speaking, regulatory takings are of two types: cate-
gorical or per se regulatory takings, and those requiring an ad hoc
inquiry.
Per se regulatory takings require no specific inquiry into the
public interest. They are generally characterized by regulations
resulting in either the permanent physical "invasion" of private prop-
erty under the government's direction,2 or the denial of all econo-
mically beneficial use of private property. 122
Alternatively, a regulatory taking can be established through an
ad hoc inquiry. Such an inquiry must result in a determination that
the regulation either shifts a public burden onto private property own-
ers' 23-after taking into account "the economic impact of interference
with investment backed expectations"124--or fails to substantially
advance a legitimate state interest.125
Given this doctrinal backdrop, to what extent does Admission to
Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) operate as a regulatory taking of a client-
depositor's beneficial interest in funds deposited with a limited prac-
tice officer? The most convenient starting point for this analysis is
119. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
120. Id. at 415.
121. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding
that a law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to emplace cable facilities in
their apartment buildings constituted a taking).
122. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
123. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992).
124. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
125. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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with per se regulatory takings. As the property interest at stake in this
case, the beneficial use of money, is intangible, it is not subject to
permanent, physical invasion as required under Loretto. On this basis,
there is no per se regulatory taking.
An arguably different result emerges under the economically
beneficial use rule of Lucas. The issue here is whether a client-
depositor is denied the economically beneficial use of funds deposited
in escrow. Because Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) requires
that such funds be placed in an interest-bearing trust account with the
interest distributed to the Legal Foundation of Washington, the
client-depositor is unable to direct the use of funds held in trust for
him by a limited practice officer. He cannot use the funds to generate
interest for his own account, nor can he consent to a limited practice
officer's use of the funds to generate earnings credits. Unable to con-
trol the beneficial use of his funds under the strictures of Admission to
Practice Rule 12. 1(c)(1), a client-depositor is unable to make any eco-
nomically beneficial use of his property. It follows that under the rule
of Lucas, Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) acts as a per se regu-
latory taking.
Suppose instead that the regulatory takings analysis takes the
route of an ad hoc inquiry. Further suppose that the eventual use of
the funds by the Legal Foundation of Washington-the funding of
legal services for the indigent-is indeed a public burden. After fac-
toring in the investment expectations of client-depositors, namely that
they can control the beneficial use of their funds as required under
Penn Central, Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) arguably shifts a
public burden onto private parties and interferes with their investment
expectations. Based on this ad hoc inquiry, Admission to Practice
Rule 12.1(c)(1) again emerges as a regulatory taking.
A second way to establish a taking through an ad hoc inquiry is
to show that a regulation or ordinance does not substantially advance a
legitimate state interest. 126 This standard of judicial review, referred to
as minimal scrutiny, is the same standard used in the review of zoning
ordinances, under which most takings claims originate. Substantially
less rigorous than the standard of review for due process and equal
protection claims, this standard reflects the judiciary's deference to the
legislature.
Analyzing Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) under this
standard is best done by breaking the standard into two components.
First, what is a legitimate "government interest?" Second, what does
it mean to "substantially advance" such an interest?
126. See id.
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While the U.S. Supreme Court has not elaborated the standards
for determining what constitutes a "legitimate state interest, ' 127 a
review of takings cases reveals a common theme. A zoning ordinance
that did not promote "the health, safety, convenience, and general
welfare of the inhabitants" led the Court to conclude that the ordi-
nance lacked the necessary state interest. 128  Alternatively, a zoning
regulation imposing density restrictions in order to protect the com-
munity at large from the ill effects of urbanization was found to
advance legitimate government goals. 129 Thus, the protection or pro-
motion of the health, safety, and general welfare of the community at
large constitutes a legitimate state interest.
How far must this protection extend? Dicta in a case involving
eminent domain suggests that at a minimum such protection must
extend beyond a particular class of individuals. 3 ' Thus, the protec-
tion afforded by the ordinance or regulation must reach those in the
community at large, including those burdened by the regulation. A
regulation that burdens one class and benefits another with no overlap
will not pass muster. 3'
How would Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) fare under
such scrutiny? This question conceivably turns on whether the fund-
ing of the Legal Foundation of Washington with funds generated by
Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) protects the health, safety, and
general welfare of the community at large. To put if slightly differ-
ently, would the health, safety, and welfare of the community at large
somehow suffer without Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1)?
Arguably it would not. While a subset of the community at large-
the beneficiaries of legal services funded by the Legal Foundation of
Washington-would no longer enjoy the benefit of free or heavily
subsidized legal services, the community at large would not be
harmed. This subset of the community, like other members of the
community, would have to pay for legal services. Furthermore, given
that the benefits of Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) extend to
only a subset of the community without benefiting those burdened by
the regulation-limited practice officers and their client-depositors-
the overlap between these two constituencies as required under Agins
does not exist. It follows that the protections afforded by Admission
to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) do not benefit the community at large and
therefore do not further a legitimate state interest.
127. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
128. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928).
129. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
130. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
131. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
What does "substantially advance" mean in the context of a
"legitimate government interest"? Like "legitimate government inter-
est," "substantially advance" is a phrase in search of meaning. How-
ever, a 1987 U.S. Supreme Court decision provides some important
guidance. 132 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court
held that in order for a regulation to substantially advance a legitimate
government interest, there must be a nexus or fit between a permit
condition imposed on an applicant for a permit and the stated pur-
poses of the regulation cited as the basis for the permit condition.133
Thus, a condition imposed pursuant to the issuance of a building per-
mit requiring a property owner to provide public access across his
property and parallel to the shoreline did not "fit" with the stated
purpose of the regulation-to provide public access from the street to
the shoreline-cited as the basis for the permit condition.'34
Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) seems to lack this same
nexus. While lawyers have struggled with the question of how to fur-
nish legal services to those who cannot pay, who are providers of legal
services, and who are in a position to help these individuals, neither
escrow holders, including limited practice officers, nor their client-
depositors were subject to such responsibility prior to the adoption of
Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1). Furthermore, they are not in a
position to directly provide any meaningful degree of legal aid. Thus,
the connection or fit between funding of the Legal Foundation of
Washington and the limits imposed on a client-depositors' beneficial
use of funds is attenuated at best. Under the Nollan standard, Admis-
sion to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) clearly does not "substantially
advance" a legitimate state interest.
Lacking the necessary legitimate state interest and/or failing to
substantially advance such an interest, Admission to Practice Rule
12.1(c)(1) fails to meet the standard set forth in Agin to avoid the
finding of a taking after an ad hoc inquiry. Under this line of inquiry
Admission to Practice Rule 12.1 (c)(1) operates as a regulatory taking.
C. Client-Depositor's Claim for Just Compensation for a Regulatory
Taking of His Beneficial Interest
Having established that Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1)
operates as a regulatory taking of a client-depositor's property-
namely, his beneficial interest in funds deposited in escrow with a
limited practice officer-a successful takings claim turns on a deter-
132. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
133. Id. at 837.
134. Id. at 838.
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mination that the client-depositor or his assignee is entitled to just
compensation.
The source of law for just compensation is the Just Compensa-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, which provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."'135 The
Just Compensation Clause, like the larger Takings Clause, was
"designed to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which in all fairness and respect should be borne by
the public as a whole.' 136
What exactly is just compensation? Although there is no single
definition, it generally means the full monetary equivalent of the prop-
erty taken,'37 the fair market value of property taken at the time of
taking, 138 measured from the standpoint of what "the owner lost, not
what the taker gained."13
In most cases, just compensation is paid pursuant to an eminent
domain proceeding brought by the government when it takes private
property for a public purpose. Alternatively, when a private property
owner alleges that the government has taken his property, either by
regulatory action or impairment of value rather than by government
agents physically taking possession of the property or judicial or legis-
lative transfer of title of the property to the government, 4' he may
receive just compensation pursuant to an action for inverse
condemnation.
The type of just compensation pursuant to an inverse condem-
nation proceeding depends on how the government elects to proceed
once a judicial determination has been made that a taking has
occurred. If the government chooses to end its taking, whether it be
by repealing the regulation or taking other action to restore the value
of the private property, a court may order just compensation for only a
temporary taking.'
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
136. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
137. See United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970).
138. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
139. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
140. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 468 (5th ed.
1995).
141. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-
les, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that just compensation is required for temporary taking of
property).
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The right to just compensation extends to takings of intangible as
14214well as tangible property, and to regulatory takings."'
Would just compensation be due if Admission to Practice Rule
12.1(c)(1) is found to effect a taking? Under Lucas, the fact that
Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) operates as a regulatory taking
certainly is not fatal to a claim for just compensation. Under City of
Cincinnati, the taking of intangible property-a client-depositor's
beneficial interest--does not stand in the way of just compensation.
The fair market value of the client-depositor's beneficial interest,
whether it is measured by the interest income foregone by the client-
depositor or the earnings credits foregone by the limited practice offi-
cer, is readily ascertainable. There is no de minimis standard for just
compensation to bar its payment; or as Justice Stevens so eloquently
put it, "the Fifth Amendment draws no distinction between grand lar-
ceny and petty larceny." '144 Given these factors, it seems that just
compensation would be due if indeed Admission to Practice Rule
12.1(c)(1) is found to effect a taking.
Whether just compensation is awarded for a temporary or per-
manent taking turns on the actions of the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington subsequent to a determination that Admission to Practice Rule
12.1(c)(1) constitutes a taking and just compensation is due. If the
supreme court chooses not to repeal Admission to Practice Rule
12.1 (c)(1), then there would be a permanent taking, and just compen-
sation must be paid accordingly. However, unless the Legal Founda-
tion of Washington can successfully execute an arbitrage strategy by
earning more interest on client-depositor funds subject to Admission
to Practice Rule 12. 1(c)(1) than it would have to pay in just compen-
sation, the prudent course of action would be to repeal Admission to
Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) and pay just compensation for a temporary
taking.
VI. CONCLUSION
A reexamination of the takings claim precipitated by Admission
to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(1) in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation suggests that such a
claim would be successful. Interest earned on a client-depositor's
funds "either nominal in amount or held for a short period of time" is
142. See City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390 (1912) (hold-
ing that power of eminent domain extends to tangibles and intangibles, including choses in
action, contracts, and charters).
143. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
144. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 727 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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clearly a form of property; the client-depositor's inability to make
beneficial use of his funds and the subsequent distribution of the
interest earned thereon to the Legal Foundation of Washington con-
stitutes a regulatory taking, both on a per se basis and after ad hoc
inquiry. Finally, the taking of such property warrants just compensa-
tion.
As a limited practice officer has no per se property interest in the
beneficial use of a client-depositor's funds, the establishment of a suc-
cessful takings claim on his behalf turns on a showing of sufficient
consent by the client-depositor to the limited practice officer's benefi-
cial use of funds. While the basis for an escrow holder's assertion of
consent-a simple disclosure in a contract that fails to reasonably
advise the client-depositor of the choices available-has in the past
done the trick, it is arguably too slender to support the level of
informed consent required in a fiduciary relationship.
What now? Assuming a takings claim is successful, the IOLTA
regulations as we know them under Admission to Practice Rule
12.1(c)(1) would be repealed. The new regulations, to the extent that
they permit a limited practice officer to make beneficial use of a client-
depositor's funds, must require meaningful informed consent on the
part of the client-depositor. To the extent the regulations under sec-
tion 208-680E-011(1) of the Washington Administrative Code gov-
erning the administration of funds by those escrow holders not
practicing as limited practice officers similarly fail to establish suffi-
cient informed consent, similar modifications are in order.
These regulations could take various forms. One possibility is
that all escrow holders, including limited practice officers, would have
to offer client-depositors a menu of choices as to how their funds will be
administered. Such choices might include depositing funds into:
" a pooled, interest bearing account, with interest distributed to
the client-depositor;
" a pooled, interest bearing account, with interest distributed to
the Legal Foundation of Washington;
* a noninterest bearing account-from the standpoint of the cli-
ent-depositor-upon which the escrow holder may earn
banking privileges in the form of earnings credits, perhaps in
exchange for a reduced escrow fee.
From this menu a client-depositor would then select the option
that best suits his interests. Such a selection could be made after con-
sultation with the escrow holder. No longer would client-depositors
merely "sign and return" escrow instructions.
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In that client-depositors would be required to make an election,
they are more likely to consult with escrow holders at the front-end of
the transaction. As such, some of the mystery surrounding the role of
escrow holders would vanish. The client-depositor could make
meaningful choices-and if he so chooses---can sufficiently manifest
the informed consent necessary for an escrow holder to make benefi-
cial use of funds in escrow. Finally, to the extent that the Legal
Foundation of Washington can make a compelling case for its inter-
ests, it too will have a seat at the table.
